

Community cohesion as safe living: delimiting the obligations to and dangers of proximity

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Note aux lecteurs

Ce texte est un brouillon, écrit originalement pour une communication orale dans le contexte d'une conférence tenue en Décembre dernier. Depuis, j'ai révisé l'argument mais n'ai pas eu le temps de le formaliser dans le texte – de sorte qu'il n'apparaît qu'à la fin. En somme, je voudrais mettre d'avantage l'emphase sur l'aspect moral de cette politique de cohésion sociale, et sur la façon dont elle vise à produire des 'ethical subjects', c'est-à-dire des sujets-citoyens responsables de leur propre sécurité et de celle des autres; des sujets-citoyens judicieux qui savent se parer contre les dangers environnants et ceux qui savent se parer contre le risque potentiel de leur culture. Je crains que le texte ci-dessous soit loin d'avoir atteint ce degré de clarté et de 'cohésion'... Le texte sera soumis sous forme d'article pour un numéro thématique de *Citizenship Studies* sur 'Designing Safe Living'. Vos commentaires seront fort appréciés.

Introduction

Community cohesion has become the 'new' framework for managing race relations in contemporary Britain. Initially established in government discourses following civil disturbances in the summer of 2001, community cohesion has developed into a preferred governing technology for the achievement of safe living. By looking at a Cabinet Office policy review document published in January 2007, this article traces how the discourse of community cohesion has evolved since 2001, in particular in relation to its framing of idealised conceptions of social proximity and closeness as means of facing the challenges posed by diversity, terrorism and economic deprivation.

I should clarify from the outset that I look at policy documents not as expressions of governing practices – that is, they do not necessarily tally with actual governing practices on the ground. But policy documents remain crucial in revealing particular

‘ways of seeing’ the world – as Gail Lewis argues, social policy documents ‘are texts that aim to lay out a problem of governance and suggest ways in which that problem might be managed or resolved. As texts they are forms of representation in which a relation between objects and subjects is constituted’ (2005: 537). By going to the ‘ways of seeing’ that policy documents open up, my aim is to attend to the ways in which policy discourses ‘figure social life in certain imaginary ways’ (Butler 2002: 28) that would exemplify the kind of coherence that is expected from individuals and groups¹ in their daily lives.

What I argue is that community cohesion is a governance technology that designs particular groups as well as particular practices in *and* out of the social space of the locality. For example, active citizenship is designed into the community along specific parameters, and those who fail – the ‘failed citizens’ – are designed out: the chav², the extremist Muslim, the illegal immigrant, the ‘bogus’ asylum seeker. At the same time, ethnic minorities other than Muslims are designed into the ‘community’ when it comes to achieving diversity and multiculturalism. A new imaginary landscape of multicultural Britain is emerging: one where British Ethnic Minorities (BMEs) are cast as settled into British society, against ‘immigrants’ and ‘Muslims’. Thus if, as some have argued, the earlier versions of community cohesion in British social policy combine visions of shared belonging with strategies of managing diversity (Alexander 2004; Worley 2005), more recent versions place a stronger emphasis on a management discourse as it relates not only to diversity, but also to migration, identity, and security. As I show below, the vision of cohesion is not so much one of shared belonging as it is one of a moral code that prescribes how to conduct oneself as an ethical subject. In this regard, community

cohesion is an ethical project; it is imagined through specific emotional and ethical injunctions, such as adhering to core civic values, or being a discerning citizen. Moreover, these injunctions are imagined in the ambivalent spatial terms of *obligations to* and *dangers of* proximity (be it proximity with ‘others’ or proximity with the ‘risk-generating capacity’ [Geary 2007: 684] of one’s culture).

‘Origins’ of community cohesion

The British government’s faith in community cohesion was formulated in the aftermath of the uprisings in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford (Northern England) between May and July 2001 and was founded in concerns about distance and closeness between neighbouring communities within a given area. New forms of closeness, of ‘being together’ were invested in ideas of ‘community cohesion’ and their related technologies of corrective citizenship which were proposed in order to groom men and women into proper citizens of multicultural Britain.

Widely reported as ‘race riots’, the 2001 ‘summer of violence’ shook the nation into self-examination about its track record in multicultural management. The riots involved large numbers of people from different backgrounds – especially young men – and resulted in the destruction of property and attacks on individuals. The confrontations were largely between Asian youths and the police, and were prompted by racist groups, including the BNP, attacking Asian individuals and communities whom the police failed to protect (Kundnani 2001: 105). Local and national enquiries were set up to investigate the causes of the riots, including the independent Review Team led by Ted Cante (Home Office 2001a; also known as the Cante Report). The Cante Report laid the foundations

for subsequent government strategies and initiatives aimed as promoting community cohesion and racial equality. Ted Cantle is regarded as the ‘founding father’ of community cohesion in Britain (Benjamin 2005) and he has been associated with those who have sounded the death knell of multiculturalism on the basis of a narrow definition that associates it with a segregationist identity politics and practices.

As I argue elsewhere (2008), the Cantle Report marked the institutionalization of ‘mixing’ as a key governing principle for the management of diversity in local communities across the country. ‘Mixing’ was widely hailed as the antidote to segregation, disaffection, distrust, hate and fear, all of which result from too much sameness. It is noticeable that for all the discussions about racism available in the plethora of Home Office documents about community cohesion (albeit a racism reductively conceptualized as barely anything more than the consequence of ignorance or jealousy, which in turn, are seen as resulting from economic deprivation), what has dominated public debates since 2001 are concerns about *ethnic* segregation and separation. ‘Ethnic’ community cohesion was consistently singled out, and the overwhelming view remains that ‘Individuals may well be well integrated into their local *ethnic or religious-based communities*, which then *creates divisions* between these communities and others’ (Home Office 2001a: 70; my emphasis). The accepted understanding is that, due to mutual fear, suspicion or plain ignorance, ‘different *ethnic* groups are increasingly segregating themselves from each other and retreating into “comfort zones” made up of people like themselves’ (Ouseley 2001: 16; my emphasis). Thus ‘ethnic’ community cohesion hinders the version of cohesion favoured by the national government: ‘social cohesion requires that participation extends *across* the

confines of local communities, knitting them together into a wider whole.’ (Ferlander and Timms in Home Office 2001a: 70; my emphasis). This version of mixing is about holding cultural boundaries tight, locked, and then talking across them. Furthermore, the key aim of this version of cohesion, as the Southall Black Sisters have pointed out, is ‘to promote racial harmony *between* communities, [while] it fails to deal with problems *within* communities’ (such as forced marriage; Southall Black Sisters in Razack 2004: 166; emphasis SBS’s).

Building on Progress

Fast forward to a recent version of community cohesion. In early 2007, the Cabinet Office published four documents resulting from a large scale policy review conducted by the Labour government under the umbrella title *Building on Progress*. Aimed at ‘identifying long-term trends and new challenges and examining how existing policies need to be changed to continue to meet the country’s priorities’, the review ‘touched on virtually all areas of policy’ organised into six strands, each of which is the subject of a Cabinet Office publication: *Public Services*; *Security, Crime and Justice*; *Britain in the World*; *Families*; *The Role of the State*; *Energy and Environment*. The only document where ‘cohesion’ appears is in the second publication: *Building on Progress: Security, Crime and Justice* (hereafter SCJ), where it is the subject of one of four thematic chapters: Crime, Security, Immigration, Cohesion. From the outset, the emplacement of cohesion in a policy review on security and crime signals an expansion of the remit of cohesion from the management of diversity to one where it is to serve in the fight against

crime and security. Consequently, this ostensibly de-racializes the social and geographical space of ‘community’.³ [EXPLAIN]

In the document’s logic, diversity results from immigration which is itself a security threat if not properly managed. In the section on cohesion, one of the policy measures proposed is to ‘ensure that there are explicit and managed processes of integrating immigrants’ which works along with ‘promot[ing] and commicat[ing] the shared values that underpin the British national civic identity.’ (SCJ: 91) So the general picture that emerges is of the safe community as one where crime has been ‘designed out’ (the document’s phrase) – through crime-proof products and increased awareness of law abiding citizens. It is also one where immigration and integration will be effectively managed thanks to identity management based on biometric technologies: identity cards would be compulsory for immigrants if they have been in the UK for more than three months. So the picture of the desirable ‘cohesive community’ that the Cabinet Office’s document conjures up is that of a ‘safe, close, vibrant, support[ive]’ community that is ‘strong internally and able to mix positively with other groups’ (SCJ: 91) It is a community where some inhabitants will have to hold ID cards, others will have fingerprint activated MP3 players and other crime-proof products, and others still will be learning English and British civic values as part of the processes that will grant them the ‘earned right’ of citizenship (p. 91). These types are not mutually exclusive, in theory, but here, they are all cast as such.

The policy review identifies the main challenges to achieving community cohesion as coming from: ‘increasing diversity; rising sympathy with extremist

sentiments; and persistent differences in life chances (including perceptions of unfair access to public services).’ (BoP-SCJ: p. 13) Let me consider each separately.

a) diversity

One striking shift in that’s occurred since 2001 is one where diversity has moved from being something to celebrate and praise, something that the Cattle Report considered was experienced as an asset by residents in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, to something that is a challenge to cohesion, a ‘problem’ of government and of governance, a disruptive force external to a pre-established ‘community’ and a potential source of conflict. This shift follows a similar shift in New Labour’s discourses of multiculturalism. From a celebration of multiculturalism as an appropriate reflection of Britain’s inherent and timeless diversity (see Fortier 2008) in the early years of the 21st century, the government has gradually distanced itself from multiculturalism, especially since 2007 [INSERT FOOTNOTE]. In January 2007, the then Prime Minister in waiting Gordon Brown relegated multiculturalism to the past, defining it as a ‘once-fashionable view’ which ‘over-emphasised separateness at the cost of unity’ (2007). Britain is not alone in distancing itself from multiculturalist politics. Since the late twentieth-century, an anti-multiculturalist backlash has been gaining ground in several western countries, leading several governments to retreat from state-sponsored multiculturalism. The general point of critique is against policies and programmes that aim at integrating minorities and immigrant populations and which are said to be differentialist and separatist rather than unifying. This critique reduces multiculturalism to being nothing but an endorsement

of what is widely conceived as the separatist ‘politics of difference’ of the last thirty years.

The move away from multiculturalism was signalled in June 2006, when the then Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly launched the Commission for Integration and Cohesion. In her speech, she expressed her sympathy for those

white Britons who do not feel comfortable with change. They see the shops and restaurants changing. They see their town and neighbourhoods becoming more diverse. Detached from the benefits of those changes, they begin to believe stories about ethnic minorities getting special treatment, and to develop a resentment, a sense of grievance ... We have moved from a period of uniform consensus on the value of multiculturalism to one where we can encourage a debate by questioning whether it is encouraging separateness ... In our attempt to avoid imposing a single British identity and culture, have we ended up with some communities living in isolation of each other?

(Kelly 2006)

Kelly’s concern about the discomfort of white Britons shifts the attention to the comfort of the *white* nation/al and away from that of the minoritized subjects that some versions of multiculturalism have aimed at (for example as one of the founding principles of ‘multicultural education’). In establishing an explicit distinction between the uncomfortable white Britons and the upsetting non-whites, Kelly is decidedly situating the origins of diversity and of discomfort on the non-white body. I use non-white deliberately here, to emphasize how ‘Whiteness’ is ‘the Universal’, the master signifier of accomplished British citizenship. Whiteness (capital ‘W’) is more than about skin colour. As Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks (2000) argues, Whiteness is about race as a regime of looking; a regime of observing, classifying and judging based on norms of behaviour that are inflected by class, sexuality, gender, age, nationality. ‘Whiteness’ is the master signifier in ‘a signifying chain that . . . constitutes a pattern for organizing human

difference. This chain provides subjects with certain symbolic positions such as “black”, “white”, “Asian”, etc., in *relation* to the master signifier’ (Seshadri-Crooks 2000: 4; my emphasis). Considerations of designing safe living, then, should attend to the limits of ‘Whiteness’ as they are configured through refractions of class, gender, sex, and generations, and that differently position white-, brown- and black-skinned people in terms of degrees of Whiteness: White enough (or not), or too White.

TRANSITION NEEDED

Who are the ‘minorities’? In the Cantle Report, South Asians and Muslims were only implicitly referred to, even though it was clear that they were those referred to as ‘ethnic’ minorities or ‘faith’ communities. In the 2007 Cabinet Office document ‘ethnic groups’ are the ‘BMEs’ – black and minority ethnic groups⁴ – who are accepted as ‘settled’ communities, and who are distinguished from ‘immigrants’ – the sources of diversity and potential tension if not properly managed. In the context of European enlargement and the inclusion of East European countries within the EU, immigrants from East Europe are now those cast as a source of concern – ‘there are too many working for too little’. A third group identified in the SCJ document is the Muslim population where extremists reside (more on this below).

So in this regard, there is a repositioning of racially minoritised populations within the national landscape of diversity. At one level, the generalization of ‘ethnic minorities’ or BMEs, and of ‘immigrants’, elides some of the specific issues faced by various groups residing in given areas – including the white English – while it produces a significant erasure of the different conditions under which peoples migrate, settle and live in England. Can the experience of South Asians, East Asians, and Caribbeans be aligned

to each other? Can the experiences of Polish and Indian immigrants aligned to each other? Moreover, the emergence of religion – namely Islam – as the marker of a separate and distinct category is in tension with the fact that numerous Muslims are Pakistanis and Bangladeshi, thus part of the ‘BME’. Their separation, however, suggests that they may face different conditions of settlement to ‘Asians’, while at the same time it also suggests that they are the source of a specific kind of problem (more on this below).

BMEs are cast in opposition to ‘Muslims’ and ‘immigrants’, in a reconfiguration of the multicultural ethnoscape of Britain. In the contemporary context, those understood as ‘settled’ communities (the BMEs) are interpellated within the national fold, and positioned *against* ‘new’ migrants and ‘new’ faith-based ethnic minorities. The whole notion of ‘settlement’ is constitutive of a politics of differentiation between migrant and non-migrant populations and different claims of citizenship and belonging that are made on the basis of length of residency. The promises of ‘settlement’ and ‘residency’ as guarantors of social and political legitimacy gloss over the additional requirement of ‘roots’ from, and ‘rootings’ in, the right place. Some minorities’ and migrants’ roots are always already foreign, and their rootings always assumed elsewhere – and as such, they are always already suspect of weak or failed allegiance to their ‘host’ countries.

Still founded in ideas of location as geographically grounded in a singular and geographically bounded locale, governing strategies aimed at fostering community cohesion fail in the face of the diasporic belongings of large sections of the population in Britain, of those immigrants and refugees, citizens and non-citizens whose multilocal ties force a separation between space of belonging and place of residence. The politics of community cohesion are fundamentally tied to a renewed politics of the neighbourhood

and deploy a set of injunctions for ‘living together’ that assume an ‘intertwining of personal and place identity’ (Home Office 2001a: 13). Tensions arise, in this context, between a localized politics of cohesion and transnational ties, with the latter leading to ‘failed’ or ‘denied’ citizenship (Lewis, 2006). ‘Active citizenship’ is defined through a scaled definition of practices: it requires the full presence of local residents so that their identities and attachments will be place-based; place of residence and place of identification are aligned as coterminous, shutting down the possibilities of diasporic belongings that include, but are not bound to, the immediate place of residence. Consequently, diasporas’ multilocal ties deem them *out-of-place* because they are not ‘here’ *though they should be* (Fortier 2006, 2008). The ideal of local cohesive community is grounded in the attempt to shift cultural identities, identifications and practices of local residents, in a scalar narratives that aligns personal feelings, feelings for the local community, and feelings for the nation on the same continuum (what Lauren Berlant calls the privatization of citizenship).

The neighbourhood is targeted in national social policies *as* a scalar unit in itself, and it is defined in terms of demographic characteristics. Sometimes this translates into an ethnic and/or class mapping of the national space, which suggests *both* disjuncture and unity between locality and the nation. That is, neighbourhoods or ‘communities’ are conceived as unique or different in terms of class and most often (multi)ethnic make-up, and situated somewhat outside of the nation, while at the same time seen as constitutive of, and resulting from, national diversity and tolerance.

b) extremism

The second challenge to the achievement of community cohesion is the ‘rising sympathy with extremist sentiments’.

Cohesion in this document is heralded as a pathway towards safe living.

‘Terrorism itself may not be prevented by increased cohesion, but lack of cohesion is considered to be a significant factor behind communities allowing extremist feelings to go unchallenged and for not condemning extremist views.’ (SCJ: 89)

And terrorism and extremism only come from Muslims. The term ‘Muslim’ occurs four times in the document, all of which in conjunction with ‘extremism’, while Islam appears three times: twice with terrorism or and once with extremism.

The separation of Muslims as and their association with extremism is clearly cast within a civilizationist argument. Cohesion becomes a means not to overcome the clash of civilization, but to provide the resilience to fight against it.

Cohesion is not about overcoming a “clash of civilisations” but building resilience against threats affecting all communities from a small number of extremists, condemned by the vast majority of our Muslim communities.

There is a need to build safe and tolerant communities, strengthening them against the threats posed by extremism. (SCJ: 84)

Huntington’s civilisationist framework epitomises Mahmood Mamdani (2004) calls the ‘culturalization’ of political conflict. The assumption is that cultural difference rather than ideology is a site of natural hostility and separation in a post-cold war era. This assumption pervades government discourses on community cohesion, especially with regards to the management of diversity conceived as a source of conflict. ‘Diversity’, here, refers primarily if not exclusively to cultural diversity, that is, ethnic, racial, national diversity. It is not about gender, sexual, or class diversity. To cast cultural

diversity as a source of conflict is not new in the areas of ethnic and racial studies. However, what the clash of civilizations argument does, is to project culture on the world stage as the foundation of international conflict. Thus here, concerns for local cohesion are explicitly related to world politics, the ‘global war on terror’, and transnational Islamicist movements. This horizon works in tandem with a culturalist conception of all minoritized groups – including the white working class – whose ‘culture’ is seen as a hindrance to the achievement of cohesion and the enactment of true active citizenship.

Indeed, as Wendy Brown argues, the contemporary liberal project is to resolve that problem by ensuring that culture is kept separate from politics and from the autonomous subject-citizen. The idea is that the citizen is ‘prior to culture and free to choose culture’ and that ‘politics is above culture and free of culture’ (Brown 2006: 167). Culture is something to be enjoyed, consumed at will and with discernment by the autonomous liberal subject. ‘Culture’, in short, is a bias – not necessarily a negative bias, but still, a bias that distorts the running of a good civil society, and as such, is potentially dangerous. A culturalist argument about ethnic conflict underpins contemporary politics of community cohesion that seek to manage and negotiate cultural, ethnic and religious differences and to avoid them erupting into public life. In this context, when ‘culture’ and ‘minority’ meet, ‘culture’ is conceived in primordialist terms – naturalized, privatized, and ruling over ‘deep feelings’. In turn, when ‘culture’ and ‘citizen’ meet, ‘culture’ is diluted and sidestepped under the banner of more laudable and ‘universal’ values. As the Cabinet Office states,

At the national level, a cohesive British society is one in which people have a clear idea of what is expected of them and share a common set of


values that *transcend* ethnic, religious or other identities. (SCJ: p. 83; my emphasis)

But it is not simply a matter of saying that ‘they’ have cultures, ‘we’ have values. As Brown pointedly argues drawing on Mamdani, the distinction is rather drawn between ‘us’ *having* culture and enjoying it, and ‘them’ *being* culture and being ruled by it (2006: 151). ‘We’ *have* culture, ‘they’ *are* culture; ‘we’ are citizens, ‘they’ are a people.

c) Class and race

The third challenge posed to community cohesion is poverty. In this regard, the privileged targets for community cohesion programmes are a working class neighbourhoods – ‘Those with poorer life chances’, the document states, ‘tend... to feel the most negative about cohesion. . . [and] can blame immigration for their circumstances’. (SCJ: p. 90). The challenge, the document continues, is to make them feel positive about migration and about diversity.

This is where the white English working class poor are imagined as hopeless monoculturalists, racists and anti-social (Haylett 2001; Skeggs 2004). In some sections of government policy, designing out crime is about designing out working class youths. The Blair government’s Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 and Respect Agenda launched in 2006 are a case in point. Both aim at tackling anti-social behaviour, defined as including a range of behaviours from ‘nuisance neighbours’ [sic], to ‘yobbish behaviour’, ‘graffiti’, or ‘reckless driving of mini-motorbikes’ – behaviours that have been repeatedly associated with working class youths. On the anti-social behaviour page of the respect.gov.uk website, a photograph appears at the top.



<http://www.respect.gov.uk/article.aspx?id=9066> [last accessed 11.03.08]

It is of four youths wearing 'hoodies' (hooded sweatshirts), standing in front of a closed storefront and talking, two of them holding a canned drink, the nature of which is unclear. Two of them also have their arms stretched out and their hands touching, as if exchanging a small item – a joint? a coin? a cigarette? a piece of paper? Moving the cursor to the photo, a small window appears bearing the message: 'asb [anti-social behaviour] hanging around'. Nothing in the photograph indicates that these youths are a nuisance. It is consistent, however, with the demonization of working class 'chav' youth as threat and as such, as the privileged target in community policing and technologies of corrective citizenship aimed at preserving good neighbourliness and social cohesion.

A final point about class → At the time of writing these lines, a series of documentaries and dramas are running on BBC Two television, about the British white working class. Entitled the 'White Season', the series' subtitle is 'Is white working class Britain becoming invisible'. In the lead up to the series, as well as running alongside it, debates and discussions on television and on BBC radio 4 have agonised about the appropriateness of the series, about the future of white Britain, or other related matters. The 'season' alone can be the subject of an separate article. Suffice it to say that alongside the denigration of white working class chavs, as mentioned earlier, what is emerging now is a desire to recover the dignity of 'white working class Britain', once conceived as the 'backbone of the nation', as the BBC Two website put it. Roly Keating, Controller of BBC Two explained that 'The White season is a complex look at how life has changed for the white working class in Britain.' And the BBC website states that 'The white working class . . . now feel that their community is under threat and largely forgotten by the Government.' It also states that 'As political parties debate the way forward for immigration, debate rages in the media and the popularity of the far-right continues to rise in some sections of society, White explores the complex mix of feelings that lead some white working class people to feel under siege as if their very sense of self is being brought into question.'

http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2007/11_november/20/bbctwo.shtml [accessed 2 December 2007]

What strikes me as I listen to the debates, are the deep feelings of loss, melancholia, disaffection, betrayal expressed by some, several, callers and commentators.

NOT SURE WHERE I'M GOING WITH THIS – NEED TO CONNECT RACE&CLASS WITH COMMUNITY COHESION. THE PEDAGOGIC AIMS OF CC – TO EDUCATE THE POORER SECTIONS OF SOCIETY ABOUT THE GOODS OF IMMIGRATION AND DIVERSITY, FOR E.G.

In conclusion

Haunted by its potential failure to stabilize desirable forms of closeness, the governance of community cohesion seeks to build worlds, to create physical and emotional spaces by annexing and diverting unwanted kinds of relations, or by containing or subverting forms of attachments that exceed the organized and predictable forms that circulate in the public domain. Policy discourses on community cohesion discursively *emplace* individuals within webs of social or institutional multicultural interactions that prescribe ways of living together and feeling for each other. Encounters with diversity are not only negotiated and ‘managed’ in literal spatial form (‘linking projects’ bussing school children between ‘ethnic’ or ‘faith’ schools, various government ‘capacity building’ strategies to regenerate multiethnic neighbourhoods, etc.), but *these relations are imagined through specific emotional and ethical injunctions*, such as mixing, tolerance, and adhering to core civic values. Moreover, these injunctions are imagined in the ambivalent spatial terms of *obligations to* and *dangers of* proximity.

Proximity is not only about spatial and physical closeness. As Greg Myers has indicated (2007), it is also scalar (the small and the large), haptic (touching and out of touch), relational (as in a network), conjunctive (the bringing together of previously or apparently unrelated entities), and it is about security – the protection of self and others,

as clearly suggested in the British government's policy review. This article suggest that 'proximity' is also moral, that is, it is deeply inflected by moral codes (more or less formalised) that set out injunctions about how to conduct oneself as an ethical subject. That is, community cohesion and its underpinning ideal of 'closeness' is framed through an ethic of collective responsibility in the fight against crime and terrorism. The project of cohesion is an ethical project which involves: (1) a confrontation with one's 'society' and immediate world – think of the citizen who is aware and prepared against crime – in which one becomes conscious of oneself as a person at risk; (2) if Muslim, an identification with oneself as a person with a culture, a culture that puts oneself and others in danger within specific conditions; (3) a discernment of the specific movements of culture that put one at risk of extremism; and (4) a reform of the relationship between oneself and one's culture so as to reduce or eliminate culture's risk-generating capacity. (from Geary 2007: 684).

To be developed → the slipperiness of 'community' in this document. How it has several meanings: from locally specific areas, to social groups, to ethnic populations, etc.

¹ The distinction between 'individuals' and 'groups' signals the ways in which some bodies are individualised yet disembodied – e.g. the citizen – while others are perceived primarily through their bodily presence that stands in for a group presence – e.g. 'Black Minority Ethnic groups' or 'BMEs', immigrants, Muslims/terrorists, etc.

² Since 2005 or so, the term 'chav' has become a ubiquitous term of abuse for white working class subjects, a bit like 'white trash' in the US.

³ Similarly, the 'community cohesion' page on the government's 'Communities and local governments' website, clearly establishes a connection between community cohesion and 'conflict resolution' which, as we read on, turns out to be 'inter-ethnic' conflict. (see <http://www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/page.asp?id=519> [accessed 21 March 2008])

⁴ These include: Black African, Black Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, other Asian, mixed.